Previous empirical studies that test for the "rationality" of economic and financial forecasts generally test for generic properties such as bias or autocorrelated errors, and provide limited insight into the behavior behind inefficient forecasts. In this paper we test for a specific behavioral bias --the anchoring bias described by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) . In particular, we examine whether expert consensus forecasts of monthly economic releases from 1990-2006 are systematically biased toward the value of previous months' releases. We find broad-based and significant evidence for such behavior, which in some cases results in sizable predictable forecast errors. Then, to investigate whether the market participants anticipate the bias, we examine interest rate reactions to economic news. We find that bond yields react only to the residual, or unpredictable, component of the surprise and not to the predictable component of the forecast error induced by anchoring, suggesting that market participants anticipate the bias embedded in expert forecasts.
ANCHORING BIAS IN CONSENSUS FORECASTS AND ITS EFFECT ON MARKET PRICES

I. Introduction
Professional forecasts of macroeconomic releases play an important role in markets, informing the decisions of both policymakers and private economic decision-makers. In light of this, and the substantial effects of data surprises on asset prices, we might expect professional forecasters to avoid making systematic prediction errors. Previous research has approached this topic by testing time series of forecasts for "rationality", an approach with a fairly long and not entirely satisfying history. Generally, such studies focus on testing for a few generic properties such as bias or autocorrelation in errors, yielding mixed results that provide limited insight into the nature of apparent bias. In addition, such studies provokebut do not answer -the question: What are the implications of non-rational forecasts for market prices? In particular, where persistent forecast biases exist, do the users of these forecasts take predictions at face value when making investment decisions or dispensing advice? Or do they see through the biases, which would make such anomalies irrelevant for market prices?
As noted by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) , psychological studies of forecast behavior find that predictions by individuals are prone to systematic biases, which induce large and predictable forecast errors. One widely-documented form of systematic bias that influences predictions by non-professionals is "anchoring," or choosing forecasts that are too close (anchored) to some easily observable prior or arbitrary point of departure. Such behavior results in forecasts that underweight new information and can thus give rise to predictable forecast errors.
We investigate whether anchoring influences expert consensus forecasts collected in surveys by Money Market Services (MMS) between 1991 and 2006. MMS is a widely-used source of forecasts in financial markets, which have also been subjected to tests of forecast efficiency (Aggarwal, et al., 1995; and Schirm, 2003) . Our study focuses on monthly macroeconomic data releases that were previously found to have substantial effects on market interest rates (Balduzzi, et. al., 2001 , Gurkaynak, et al, 2005 Goldman Sachs, 2006) .
We test a hunch -born of years spent monitoring data releases and market reactions -that recent past values of the data release act as an anchor on expert forecasts. For instance, in the case of retail sales, we investigate whether the forecast of January sales growth tends to be too close to the previously-released estimate of December sales growth.
We find broad-based and significant evidence that professional consensus forecasts are anchored towards the recent past values of the series being forecasted. The degree and pattern of anchoring we measure is remarkably consistent across the various data releases.
Moreover, the influence of the anchor in some cases is quite substantial. We find that the typical forecast is weighted too heavily towards its recent past. These results thus indicate that anchoring on the recent past is a pervasive feature of expert consensus forecasts of economic data releases known to move market interest rates.
These findings imply that the forecast errors or "surprises" are at least partly predictable. Since data surprises measured in this way have significant financial market effects, one must wonder whether these effects represent efficient responses to economic news. If market participants simply take consensus forecasts at face value and treat the entire surprise as news, then interest rate reactions to data releases would display greater volatility, relative to a world with rational forecasts.
Our second major contribution thus involves assessing whether anchoring bias in economic forecasts affects market interest rates. Specifically, do interest rates respond to the predictable, as well as the unpredictable, component of the surprise? To answer this question, we decompose the surprise in each data release into a predictable component induced by anchoring, plus a residual that can be interpreted as the true surprise to the econometrician. We then test whether market participants anticipate the bias by regressing the change in the two-year (or ten-year) U.S. Treasury yield in the minutes surrounding the release onto these two components of the forecast error.
We find that the bond market reacts strongly and in the expected direction to the residual, or unpredictable, component of the surprises. On the other hand, interest rates do not appear to respond to the predicted piece of the surprise induced by anchoring. The results are similar for almost every release we consider. We thus conclude that, by and large, the market looks through the anchoring bias embedded in expert forecasts, so that this behavioral bias does not induce interest rate predictability or excess volatility.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II lays out the conceptual and empirical framework for the analysis. Section III describes basic properties of the data releases and MMS consensus forecasts. Section IV estimates the proposed model of anchoring bias. Section V tests whether the anchoring bias affects the response of market interest rates to data releases. Section VI concludes. Testing whether macroeconomic forecasts have the properties of rational expectations has a fairly long tradition. A variety of early studies (e.g., Mullineaux, 1978; Zarnowitz, 1985) investigated whether consensus macroeconomic forecasts were consistent with conditional expectations as measured in linear regressions on available data. Among the most recent studies, Aggarwal, Mohanty and Song (1995) and then Schirm (2003) applied this line of investigation to surveys of forecasts compiled by MMS.
II. Forecast Bias, Anchoring, and Research Design
While the more recent studies brought some new methodological considerations to the table, they have largely followed the basic formulation of this line of research. In particular, the typical analysis involves running regressions with the actual (realized) value of the data release, t A , as the dependent variable on the most recent forecast, t F , as the independent variable; that is, 1 One example where such behavior had actual financial ramifications is provided by Northcraft and Neale (1987) , who find that professional real estate agents anchor their forecast of a home's selling price to the listing price.
The hypothesis of rationality holds that β 1 is not significantly different from unity and the errors are not autocorrelated. 2 Broadly speaking, the results from such regressions tend to be mixed, with rationality being rejected in a substantial fraction of the tests. Both Aggarwal et al. (1995) and Schirm (2003) find that, when rationality is rejected, it is almost always due to a slope coefficient β 1 greater than unity. As an example of a strong rejection, Schirm (2003) estimates a slope coefficient of 1.62 in equation (1) for Durable Goods
Orders, which suggests that the MMS consensus predictions are too cautious; that is, errors would be reduced if forecasted deviations (from average growth) were magnified 62 percent.
If forecasts could be improved by systematically magnifying them, the implication would be that forecasters are too slow or cautious when incorporating new information.
Indeed, in a different setting, Nordhaus (1987) provides direct evidence of forecast inertia --that forecasters "hold on to their prior view too long." That inference is drawn from an analysis of fixed-event forecasts of GDP growth, which shows that forecast revisions tend to be highly serially correlated. 3 That setting differs from the more conventional time series with rolling-event forecasts, including the MMS forecasts that we analyze.
If forecasters in the standard rolling-event setting put too little weight on new information, this raises the question: What is the prior, or anchor, on which forecasters place too much weight? One plausible scenario is that forecasters treat the value of the previous month's data as the most salient single piece of information that has come to the fore in the time between their previous-month and current-month forecasts. If so, then the previous month's realization might be treated as a starting point, or anchor, for the current forecast.
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More generally, forecasters might place some weight on a few lags of the release, particularly when the forecasted series tends to bounce around from month to month (i.e., exhibits negative autocorrelation). At the extreme, forecasters might conceivably anchor their forecast on a long-run average value for the series.
To develop this set of ideas more formally, consider the following transformation of equation (1), whereby the forecast is subtracted from both sides. This yields an alternative version of the basic rationality test, where the forecast error or "surprise" (S) is regressed on the forecast:
Now, the canonical test of rationality examines whether the slope coefficient is significantly different from zero. Under our alternative hypothesis, we look for evidence in favor of the following model of forecast anchoring: λ < in equation (3)).
As stated at the outset, such a finding might be interpreted as evidence in favor of the Tversky and Kahneman (1974) "adjustment and anchoring" heuristic. However, it bears emphasizing that a finding of forecast bias would not constitute unambiguous evidence that forecasters are irrational or that they are inefficient data processors. Absent an analysis of the incentive structure they face, we cannot rule out the possibility that the behavior reflects their optimal response to a game among forecasters and the consumers of those forecasts.
For instance, Ottavani and Sorensen (2006) produce a model in which forecasters might find it optimal to issue forecasts that underweight their own private signal while overweighting a common prior. Moreover, actual incentive structures might give rise to non-quadratic loss functions which would cause optimal forecasts to deviate from conditional expectations. In our empirical analysis, we give some consideration to the robustness of our results to a nonquadratic loss function.
B. Market relevance of economic data and consensus forecasts
Along a separate line of research, several studies have analyzed the news content of data releases by measuring the surprise component of a release as the discrepancy between its actual value and the consensus forecast from MMS Services. Balduzzi, Elton and Green (2001) as well as Gurkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) study the impact of macroeconomic news on interest rates using MMS consensus forecasts to gauge surprises. Aggarwal and Schirm (1992) use the deviation between macroeconomic releases and consensus MMS forecasts to investigate the reaction of exchange rates to innovations in the U.S. trade balance. Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003) examine the effects of this and other macroeconomic news on exchange rates. In each study, these surprises are shown to have large and significant effects on financial market prices.
In light of the strength of financial market reactions to surprises measured in this way, it would be of both academic and practitioner interest to understand how systematic biases in economic forecasts might influence financial market reactions to news. Do financial market prices react to the predictable component of the surprise, or forecast error, arising from anchoring bias in the same way that they react to the residual component of the surprise? Or do market participants anticipate the bias, and thus respond only to the residual component of the surprise?
We study this question by estimating second-stage event-study regressions in which the change in the 2-year or 10-year Treasury yield around the time of the release is regressed on the two components of equation (4): These two alternative hypotheses are explored in section V.
III. Data and Sample Characteristics
A. Macroeconomic Releases, Forecasts and Surprises
Our analysis covers eight macroeconomic data releases: Consumer Confidence, Consumer Price Index (CPI), Durable Goods Orders, Industrial Production, ISM Manufacturing Index, New Homes Sales, and Retail Sales. 5 In two cases, we also examine the consensus forecasts of a key subcomponent of the top-line figure in the release --CPI ex-Food and Energy (Core CPI) and Retail Sales ex-Auto. In both cases, these data are released simultaneously with the top line release and are considered by market participants to contain more value-relevant news than the top line. We focus on these eight key releases because of their previously identified and important influence on interest rate markets. Specifically, Balduzzi, Elton and Green (2001) show that each of these releases has statistically significant and economically important effects on bond yields at both the two-year and ten-year maturity; specifically, surprises explain 20 to 60 percent of the variability in the movements of the two-year and ten-year Treasury yields in the moments surrounding each release.
In Table II we present some summary statistics for each release ( A ), its associated MMS forecast, ( F ), and forecast surprise ( S ). For each variable we report the sample mean, μ , standard deviation, σ , and the sum of the autoregressive coefficients from a fifth order auto-regression, j ρ ∑ , a measure of persistence.
7 Releases expressed in levels appear at the top of Table II , followed by the remaining releases. The mean surprise, reported in Table II , is typically close to zero, suggesting that the forecasts are unconditionally unbiased. Also, the standard deviations of the forecasts are in every case smaller than that of the releases. As one would hope, the standard deviation of the surprises is typically smaller than that for the underlying release, with Core CPI being the only exception. Not surprisingly, for data releases that are expressed in levels, which have a high degree of persistence, surprises are a lot less variable than the underlying release.
The persistence properties of the variables listed in Table II Table II are not sensitive to this choice.
amount of negative serial correlation, and thus the negative serial correlation of the data shows up in the surprises. Interestingly, these are not the only releases where the surprise exhibits significant negative serial correlation. The surprise is negatively serially correlated in every case except for the ISM release. It is also statistically significant in the case of the CPI, New Home Sales, Retail Sales and Retail Sales ex-Auto, suggesting that the MMS forecasts are conditionally biased.
The finding that the serial correlation in surprises tends to be negative rather than positive suggests that serial correlation in surprises could be due to the anchoring of forecasts on the most recent lagged value of the release. This can be illustrated by a simple example in which the release is serially uncorrelated. Suppose forecasts were strongly anchored toward the recent past -in particular, that the current forecast is set equal to the lagged actual value,
In this simplified setting it is easy to see that,
that is, successive surprises will be negatively correlated.
Finally, before moving on to the main results, we note the unusual empirical properties of the Core CPI and its associated forecasts. As shown in Table II , the Core CPI is by far the least variable of all releases; that is, both the release and the associated surprise are significantly less volatile than any other release or surprise. Over our sample period, the MMS forecast of Core CPI is nearly constant, equal to 0.2% (monthly inflation rate) in 117 8 In each case the modulus of the inverse roots of the estimated auto-regression are all smaller than one. 9 In the case of Retail Sales the high degree of negative serial correlation can be partly explained by the presence of a few outliers occurring in the wake of 9/11/2001. In October, Retail Sales fell by 2.4%. In November, Retail Sales increased by 7.1% and in December Retail Sales fell by 3.7%. Removing these periods increases the estimate of j ρ ∑ to -0.55 which is statistically significant at all conventional significance levels. In the case of Durable Goods Orders removing these three months only increases the point estimate of
out of 176 months. Thus, in the case of the Core CPI, this sample period seems poorly suited to conducting our tests. Still, we include the Core CPI release in our analysis because Core CPI surprises have substantial interest rate effects, which might otherwise be spuriously attributed to top line CPI surprises.
B. Interest Rate Reactions to Macroeconomic News Releases
We measure the reaction of the two-year and ten-year U.S. Treasury yield in the moments surrounding each macroeconomic release using quote data from Bloomberg. For each release and maturity we extract the quoted yield from a trade occurring both five minutes prior and ten minutes after the release. The interest rate reaction is defined as the difference between the post-and pre-release quote. If no quote exists five minutes before (ten minutes after) the release, we use the last quote available between five and thirty minutes before the release (the first quote available between ten and thirty minutes after the release).
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In Table III we display the mean, standard deviation and the sum of autoregressive coefficients of the interest rate reactions. The average interest rate response is always close to zero, which is consistent with the near-zero mean of the associated surprises. The standard deviations of the interest rate reactions provide some information about how much releases affect interest rates. Consistent with the findings of Gurkaynak, et. al., (2005) the standard deviations of the two-year and ten-year yield change are roughly similar. Also, 10 In unusual cases where no quote exists 30 minutes preceding the release, no yields are recorded, resulting in a missing value for the associated interest rate reaction. whether any of the apparent predictability in these reactions can be traced to predictability of the associated surprises.
IV. Estimates of Anchoring Bias
As discussed in section II, our test for anchoring bias in MMS consensus forecasts is based on the regression
where the dependent variable is the realized forecast error (or "surprise") and the independent, or prediction, variable equals the difference between the forecast and the hypothesized anchor, 11 Implementation requires specifying the history of release values (h) used in our estimate of the anchor, h A . We focus on two cases; in the first, h A is simply the lagged value of the release ( 1 h = ), while in the second, it equals the average value of the release over the lagging three months ( 3 h = ).
12 A positive value of the coefficientγ would constitute evidence that forecast errors are biased in a predictable fashion that is consistent with anchoring.
Before proceeding, it should be noted that this regression has some fairly close antecedents in the literature on rationality tests. In particular, equation (7) in Aggarwal, et. al, (1995) would look very similar if the forecast were subtracted from both sides of their equation. Otherwise, their regression differs in only two respects: (i) they effectively include only one lagged value of the release, multiplied by a constant (the autoregressive parameter of the forecasted series) and (ii) their estimation places no testable constraint on the coefficient estimates. In a sense, the main innovation here relative to that regression is interpretive, induced by a different orientation and the resulting testable constraints.
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We present the two alternative estimates of equation (4) for each of the macroeconomic releases listed in Table I . The results for the three releases reported (and predicted) in the form of levels are shown in the top three rows of Table IV Broadly speaking, the results indicate a fairly consistent pattern of bias in macroeconomic forecasts. The estimated coefficient on the gap between the consensus forecast and the previous month's release (one-month anchoring) is positive for every release; and, in six of ten cases, it is significant at the 1% level. Considering these results together with those from the three-month anchoring model, we find that the dominant model (in bold) has a significantly positive coefficient for 8 of 10 releases. Aside from the Core CPI, which earlier was shown to be a poor candidate for this analysis, the coefficient in the dominant (bold) model fails to be significant only in the case of the ISM Manufacturing Index. The 2 R of the dominant models (again excluding the Core CPI) ranges from 1.3 to 25 percent, with an average value of around 11 percent.
The pattern of results is also sensible in light of the time series properties of the releases. The top three data releases, each of which is expressed in levels, were shown in Table III to display a high degree of persistence. In all three of these cases, we find that the model with the one-month lag as the anchor clearly dominates the model based on the threemonth anchor. Although anchoring itself may or may not be rational, the forecasters seem sophisticated enough to treat further lags of these three releases as largely redundant.
In the case of Consumer Confidence and New Home Sales, looking at the point estimates of γ suggests the anchoring bias is not only statistically significant but that its influence also can be sizable. In the case of Consumer Confidence, the point estimate of 0.71 suggests that, to minimize the mean squared error, the average forecast would have to be shifted by 71 percent further from the lagged release value (in the direction indicated by the sign of the gap). In terms of the framework laid out it equations (3) and (4), forecasters are placing roughly 40 percent of the weight on the previous month's release and only 60 percent on the expected value. Among the other change variables, the 2 R covers a range comparable to that of the level
variables.
An implicit assumption of the OLS framework, is that the professional forecasters' goal is to minimize the squared forecast errors. But they might face incentives under which this goal is not optimal, making our evidence potentially misleading. As an alternative, Basu and Markov (2004) suggest the use of a linear loss function, which is implemented vis-à-vis median regression, based on the notion that a 3 percent forecast error may only be three times more costly than a 1 percent error rather than nine times as costly. Indeed, in a study of earnings forecasts, they find that evidence of bias is significantly weakened when the median regression approach is adopted.
We examine the robustness of our results by estimating equation (7) using the median regression approach and find remarkably consistent results to those in Table IV. 14 Specifically, we find significant evidence of anchoring (t-stat in excess of 2.0) in all but one case where the OLS produced significant evidence of anchoring, the exception being New
Home Sales (the 3-month case). Moreover, median regression estimates also resulted in statistically significant anchoring in two specifications where the OLS results did not --the ISM Index and Nonfarm Payrolls. In addition, point estimates are remarkably similar across the OLS and median regressions. The average difference (in absolute value) between the estimates of γ , across all the specifications, is only 0.06. Thus, the finding of anchoring does not rely on the assumption of a quadratic loss function.
The results in Table IV indicate that the gap between the current forecast and the anchor predicts future surprises in almost every release we consider. In those tests, the alternative hypothesis is that forecast errors are unpredictable, that is, orthogonal to all known information. A more demanding test of our model would involve testing it against a more general model, for instance, a model where the forecast error might be related to the current forecast for some unspecified reason. To implement this, we test whether the 14 We do not report the results of the median regression because of their similarity to the OLS results in Table  IV . The results, however, are available upon request.
coefficient on the hypothesized anchor is opposite in sign and equal in magnitude to the coefficient on the current forecast.
In Table V we show estimates of the following unrestricted anchoring model,
For these regressions, we choose the anchor from the best-fitting model in Table IV . The first column in Table V Employment, where the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 10%, but not the 5%, level.
Even there, the discrepancies between f γ and A γ are relatively small. Finally, comparing the fit of the unrestricted and restricted (Table IV, Our model of anchoring bias assumes that forecasters always tilt their forecast toward the value of the previous month's (or few months') release by a similar proportion.
On the other hand, it is plausible that the extent to which forecasters treat a lagged release as reasonable starting point for current-month forecasts could depend on whether that lagged release is viewed as representative or normal. For instance, when lagged realizations are far out of line with recent trends or broader historical experience, they may have less influence on current forecasts. Of course, the opposite might be true; that is, it might be that most of the anchoring occurs on the heels of outliers or trend-breaking observations, while very little anchoring occurs in normal times.
In principle such considerations would suggest that a more complex specification than our simple anchoring model might be informative, but there is no clear a priori case for any particular alternative. Thus, rather than postulate a more complicated anchoring model, we simply re-estimate equation (4) on a sub-sample of observations that excludes outliers.
Specifically, we exclude observations in which the change in the release from month 2 t − to 1 t − is larger than 1.5 standard deviations of the historical monthly change in the release.
The results are contained in Table VI. As with the model restriction tests in Table V , we report results only for the bestfitting model (1-month or 3-month anchoring) based on the Table IV The broad picture that emerges from Tables IV, V and VI is one in which anchoring plays a statistically and economically meaningful role in determining MMS forecasts of key macroeconomic releases. In some cases the estimates imply that the anchor receives as much as a 40 percent weighting (Consumer Confidence) in the current forecast and the anchoring variable can account for up to 25 percent (Retail Sales) of the variance in future surprises. The pattern in the results is remarkably uniform. Accordingly, anchoring appears to be an important and robust feature of the MMS forecast data. These findings thus raise the question that we examine in the second part of our analysis: How does anchoring bias in these forecasts affect market reactions to the measured surprises?
V. Testing Market Reactions
A. The Framework
This section examines the implications of anchoring bias in macroeconomic forecasts for bond market reactions to the data releases. A large literature uses MMS forecasts to measure surprises in macroeconomic releases, which are then used to gauge the effect of macroeconomic news on asset prices (Aggarwal and Schirm, 1992; Balduzzi, et al., 2001; Andersen, et al., 2003 , Gurkaynak, et al, 2005 . These studies examine the reaction of equity prices, exchange rates, and interest rates to differences between macroeconomic releases and the associated forecasts in the minutes surrounding the releases. The typical specification in these studies takes on the following form:
where t i Δ represents the change in the asset price in a small window surrounding the release and the coefficientδ measures the sensitivity of the asset price to the surprise, t t t S A F ≡ − .
The results above imply that these surprises--or forecast errors, to be precise --are partly predictable due to anchoring bias in the MMS forecasts. If markets are informationally efficient and market participants understand the nature of this bias, then market prices should anticipate this component of the forecast error. In particular, market interest rates should not respond to the predictable component of the forecast error. We investigate this hypothesis using the model laid out in equation (5) Moreover, our analysis differentiates between forecasters and trader/investors.
B. Empirical Results
Before reviewing the empirical results, we first introduce two variations on the basic specification of equation (5) 
Here, ( ) The model is estimated via GMM. In particular, note that the terms ( ) e e t t S SX that appear in equation (10) and (11) are not directly observed and must be estimated from the first stage anchoring model in equation (4). These generated regressors influence the sampling distribution of the interest rate response coefficients '  '  1  2  1  2 ( , , , ) δ δ δ δ . In particular, the sampling variability induced by using generated regressors tends to increase the amount of sampling variability in the second stage coefficients. We follow the approach of Newey (1984) by including the first stage anchoring model, equation (4), along with the second stage event-study regressions, equations (10) and (11), in the GMM system. 16 The resulting variance-covariance matrix fully accounts for the use of generated regressors in equations (10) and (11).
The results from GMM estimation of equations (10) and (11) are contained in Table   VII . The parameter estimates have been scaled so that they reflect the effect on yields, in basis points, of a change in the independent variable equal to one standard deviation of the 16 Note that the system defined by equations (4), (10) and (11) is exactly identified so that the point estimates are numerically identical to those obtained from first estimating equation (4) by OLS and then using the predicted surprises, ( ) e e t t S SX , in OLS estimates of equation (10) and (11). Including equations (4), (10) and (11) in the GMM system only affects the variance-covariance matrix of the estimates. Details of the GMM system are contained in an appendix. 17 In the case of Retail Sales ex-Auto and Core CPI we report the results for ( ) R that are discussed in the text are reported in the row relating to the top line release. Finally, in the case of Retail Sales and Retail Sales ex-Auto, the reported φ parameter reflects the effect of a revision to Retail Sales and Retail Sales ex-Auto, respectively.
Looking down the columns of Table VII reveals three broad findings. First, consistent with previous research, we find that the releases account for a significant fraction of bond yield movements, ranging from roughly 20 to 50 percent, as measured by the 2 R .
Second, the estimate of 2 δ , the coefficient on the unexpected component of the surprise on bond yields, is significant at the 1% level for every release except the CPI. Third, 1 δ , the effect of the expected component of the surprise on bond yields, is about as often negative as it is positive, is typically an order of magnitude smaller than 2 δ ; and it is insignificant in every case. Moreover, the results are quite similar across the short and long end of the yield curve. The Wald test of the null hypothesis that bond yields react symmetrically to the unexpected and expected components of the surprise is rejected at the 10% level or lower in 5 out of 8 cases.
18 This is notable since the Wald test fully accounts for the extra variability in the measurement of 1 δ resulting from e t S being a generated regressor.
Focusing on the results for individual releases indicates that the exceptions to the broad pattern of results can largely be rationalized as special situations. First, for the (top line) CPI, both the expected and unexpected components of the surprise are not significant; and so we obviously would be unable to reject the hypothesis that the components have the same effect. But this owes to the finding that, conditional on Core CPI, shocks to the total CPI (including Food and Energy) have little incremental effect on bond yields. policy. The other obvious exception is in the Core CPI results. Here, we find that the estimated magnitude of 2 δ is large and not significantly different from 1 δ . But this result presumably owes to the poor performance of the anchoring model for the Core CPI, which explains less than 1 percent of the variation in the surprise. As argued already, this could be attributable to the granularity of Core CPI and its resultant lack of time-series variation in our sample period.
A few other aspects to our findings in Table VII are notable, even if not central to our main hypotheses. First, we are comforted by the finding --consistent with previous research findings and views on Wall Street --that the employment release shows the largest interest rate effects and has the most explanatory power of all the releases (in the event study window). It is also interesting to note that in every case where it is available, the revision to the previous month's data (φ ) also has a significant positive effect on interest rates.
Surprisingly, in most of these cases, the coefficient on the revision is almost as large as the coefficient on the current month (residual) surprise.
Finally, for comparison purposes, column 6 shows 2 R statistics from the standard event study regression model of data surprises, equation (8), which does not split up the forecast error into the two pieces. Comparing these statistics to those in column 5 provides one quantitative measure of how much better our anchoring model explains interest rate movements compared to that benchmark. Comparing columns (5) and (6) Moreover, focusing on the unpredictable component of the surprise uniformly increases the explanatory power of the releases for interest rate changes. Accordingly, these results suggest that the informational inefficiency of MMS forecasts identified in Tables IV, V and VI does not lead to any important source of inefficiency in interest rate markets. Market participants apparently anticipate the anchoring behavior of professional forecasters.
VI. Conclusions
We find that professional economic forecasts are biased in a manner consistent with a specific behavioral model of forecasting behavior: the anchoring and adjustment hypothesis of Kahneman and Tversky (1974) . Specifically, we find that forecasts of any given release are anchored toward recent months' realized values of that release, thereby giving rise to predictable surprises. In some cases, such as Retail Sales, we find that up to 25% of the surprise in the macroeconomic release is predictable, due to a substantial weight being placed on the anchor by professional forecasters. Moreover, the evidence in favor of anchoring is remarkably consistent across each of the key releases that we study and is robust to the exclusion of outliers.
point estimates of 1 δ . Typically, the difference between these two measures is on the order of 0.1-0.2 percentage points.
In light of the significant evidence of systematic bias in professional forecasts, we examine the implications for market prices of U.S. Treasury bonds. Specifically, we examine whether yields on 2-year and 10-year Treasury yields react to the predictable component of forecast surprises induced by anchoring behavior. Across the board, we find that interest rates only respond to the unpredictable component of the surprise. Estimates of the market reaction to the predictable component of data surprise in every case are small and insignificant, whereas the estimated reaction to the unpredictable component is large and significant.
We thereby conclude that market participants do not take professional forecasts at face value when responding to macroeconomic news. To the contrary, at least some influential market participants are apparently able to parse the component of these forecasts due to anchoring from the component of the forecasts containing useful information about the expected future path of these macroeconomic variables. As a result, the behavioral bias displayed by the forecasts does not translate into a similar behavioral bias in market reactions to macroeconomic news.
These findings suggest a variety of directions for future research. We identify a source of forecast bias consistent with a particular behavioral hypothesis; however, one cannot conclude that forecasters are irrational or that they are inefficient data processors based on this evidence alone. There could well be important professional considerations that induce forecasters to issue "conservative" forecasts relative to some naïve prior. For instance, investors might see these monthly economic forecasts as signals of the forecaster's perception of the underlying trend. In that case, minimizing mean squared or absolute error would not necessarily be the optimal strategy.
A related point is that our findings only provide a characterization of the bias of a "representative forecaster", and this ignores the likelihood that there are substantial crosssectional differences in ability. What is more, individual forecasts are likely to be influenced by strategic considerations, as suggested by Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996) or Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006) . Indeed, the latter study models circumstances in which forecasters might find it optimal to issue forecasts that underweight their own private signals.
Finally, our findings raise the question of whether other markets are as adept as the U.S. Treasury market at processing the information in professional forecasts. In particular,
we wonder whether biases in professional forecasts are a source of inefficiency in markets that are commonly perceived to be less efficient than the U.S. Treasury market, such as markets for individual stocks. Specification of GMM System Reported in Table VII Following Newey (1984) , we account for the generated regressors in equations (10) and (11) by including the specification of the anchoring model, equation (4), in the GMM system. Specifically, we estimate the following exactly identified GMM system for each data release (row) contained in Table VII. ( ) 
in the case of Consumer Confidence, ISM index, New Homes Sales, Durable Goods, Industrial Production and Nonfarm Payroll employment. In the case of Retail Sales and CPI we estimate the system, 
Finally, we note that a separate system is estimated for each release and each bond maturity (2 and 10 year). R from the full sample.
The fourth and fifth column report the parameter estimate, γ , and 2 R from the sub-sample. Newey-West (1987) t-statistics appear in parentheses. R from a regression of the interest rate change on the total surprise, 2 S R , in the final three columns .
